Using the North Africa scenario and background (attached), recommend (and justify):
What capabilities each Service could provide that would be particularly effective in this crisis? (Why select one capability over others? What are the pluses and minuses of each capability?)
What impact does the availability of strategic lift have on the capabilities recommended and the sequencing/flow into the Joint Operations Area? Do strategic lift requirements alter the capabilities selection their availability? If so, how?
What command and control structure would be best suited as the U.S. integrates with host nation and possible coalition partners?
In answering the above questions, one should consider the following:
What implications do the scenario timelines and location(s) have on the capabilities recommended?
What limitations are there on employing the recommendations?
Are there complementary capabilities between Services that contribute to greater overall effectiveness? For the capabilities each Service offers, what do they need from other Services to make them fully effective, or more effective?
If more than one Service offers similar capabilities, are there reasons to prefer one rather than the other in this scenario?
How does the maturity of the theater affect the choice of capabilities? How will they get there, and how will they be sustained? Where can they be based, if needed?
What risk does the recommendation carry?
Are there redundant capabilities in the recommendations? If so, what are the implications?
What are the limitations of what can be accomplished in the crisis?
Does the choice of capabilities affect the ability to “disengage” if national policy so dictates?
Would the recommendation(s) change if the U.S. is expected to maintain a permanent presence in the local area? How would they change?
Are there potential coalition partners who might offer capabilities that enhance the recommendations?
Note: Do not address these points individually as the questions are answered. Use them to analyze the situation and potential capability requirements and to justify/support selected capabilities.
Below are the essential broad strokes of the notional scenario (more detail is included with the Summative Assessment 6 guidance on BB):
The scenario is situated on Europe’s southern flank (North Africa). (Look at the maps in the scenario – one of which is reproduced here)
U.S. intelligence assesses that Algeria has the capability to launch a full-scale offensive into Morocco with less than 36-hour notice.
King Mohamed IV has asked the United States and the UN for military assistance to deter and, if necessary defend against/defeat the possible invasion of his nation.
As a member of the JCS J5 staff, you have been tasked to conduct a preliminary assessment of the potential use of U.S. military capabilities in support of Morocco. The U.S. mission would be to deter and, if necessary, defend against/defeat Algerian aggression.
To help us with practical application in the context of the SA-6 scenario, I offer the following points to consider:
How do the mission/objective and time, space, force considerations inform my initial operational idea?
In balancing the operational factors against the objective, how can I create a specific space-force relationship at a particular time?
Does the competition continuum help me think through my approach to the crisis?
Could naval diplomacy play a role? How could naval forces support the higher-order objective?
Remember our current Block 4 focus, what “Service X” capabilities are well-suited to attain the assigned objective(s)?
Taking the “Naval” services as an example, I summarize a few of their capabilities and/or unique considerations below. This will need to be mirrored for the other, “Non-Naval” Services.
US Navy considerations:
The U.S. Navy employs a wide range of air, surface, and subsurface assets across a range of warfare areas (AW, AMD, AMW, Submarine Warfare, ASW, ASUW). Some worthy ideas on these six disciplines include the following:
Regarding AW: for obtaining/maintaining sea control, AW allows a commander to defend own forces and detect and attack enemy forces at extended ranges; concentration of striking effort does not require concentration of ships.
Regarding AMD: the dominant principles of AMD are defense in depth concurrent with offensive strike; naval combined arms is required to conduct AMD effectively.
Regarding AMW: amphibious operations are a form of power projection—the fruits of gaining sea control—and are by nature, combined arms; because ultimate objectives are on land, amphibious operations, while complex, can yield decisive results; characteristics of amphibious warfare can significantly challenge C2.
Regarding Submarine Warfare: submarines are the stealthiest platforms in the Fleet.
Regarding ASW: ASW is not about simply detecting and destroying the submarine; the objective of ASW is to defeat the enemy’s employment of submarine forces: from home port all the way to where they can potentially use their weapon systems; biggest challenge for employing submarines is timely coordination with surface and air forces.
Regarding ASUW: As part of gaining sea control, surface/anti-surface warfare combines a wide array of weapons, platforms, and sensors from the air, surface, and subsurface domains to detect, target, and attack adversary surface targets; in addition to mobility and persistence, networking enables surface warfare forces to concentrate firepower against specific surface targets while remaining dispersed and mutually supportive.
Naval forces operate forward and are responsive, flexible, mobile, scalable, sustainable, and lethal.
USN capabilities are relevant across the competition continuum.
Naval forces can task-organize for specific missions.
Major deployable elements include the Carrier Strike Group (CSG), the Amphibious Ready Group/Marine Expeditionary Unit (ARG/MEU), and Surface Action Group (SAG).
Naval forces can mitigate constraints in factor time and factor space.
The Navy’s primary role within the joint force is to dominate the fight at sea in order to influence events on land in support of national interests.
USCG considerations:
The USCG is a military force with civilian responsibilities (and attendant authorities). It “speaks the language of both military and civilian organizations” and can help coordinate the actions of U.S. and foreign military forces and civilian agencies in the maritime arena.
Coast Guard “white hulls” can often access areas and situations that are otherwise inaccessible to the CCDR or Joint Force Commander. As Geoffrey Till puts it, “grey-painted warships may well be seen as unhelpfully escalatory.”
USCG deployable specialized forces (DSF) are teams of readily available and globally deployable personnel and assets with specialized capabilities. Three examples of USCG deployable specialized forces are MSRTs, TACLETs/LEDETs, and PSUs.
The USCG maintains a consistent presence in the geo-strategically important Arctic. With the planned delivery of polar security cutters in the years ahead, that presence will continue. “In the high latitudes, ‘presence absolutely equals influence!’” (Then- Commandant Admiral Schultz, 2022 State of the Coast Guard address)
USMC considerations:
Marine Corps component commanders normally task-organize for operations by forming MAGTFs—balanced, air-ground, combined arms formations under a single commander.
The four basic types of MAGTFs – MEFs, MEBs, MEUs, and SPMAGTFs – vary in size and capability according to the assigned or likely missions and are specifically equipped for rapid deployment by air or sea.
A key feature of the MAGTF is its expandability. Crisis response may require a larger force than what can initially be brought to bear. Being able to expand the original force—rather than replacing it with a larger one—promotes continuity of operations.
MAGTFs are self-sustaining for a specific duration (e.g., a MEU deploys with 15 days of supply).
The MEB, the middleweight MAGTF, is capable of forcible entry and deploys on amphibious shipping or through a combination of strategic airlift and Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS).
In addition to amphibious operations, Marines can support sea control and sea denial objectives.
Recent Commentary on USCG and USMC forces and the Competition Continuum:
“The Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) is central to crisis response. It represents a combat credible and operationally suitable force effective for competition, countering gray zone activities, setting conditions for the joint force, and reinforcing our networks of allies and partners. Further, it packs an all-domain ‘punch’ in conflict.” — Marine Corps Force Design 2030, May 2022 Update
“…we’re also working more closely with our partners in ways that aren’t quite so visible. And that includes tackling gray-zone actions that chip away at international laws and norms. And we’re bringing to bear the full resources of the U.S. government…[including] unprecedented Coast Guard investments in the Indo-Pacific…Next year, our Coast Guard will also deploy a cutter to Southeast Asia and Oceania. That will open up new opportunities for multinational crewing, training, and cooperation across the region.” – Secretary of Defense Austin, Remarks at Shangri-La Dialogue, 11 Jun 2022.
“Today, the situation in the Indo-Pacific seems ripe for such an inadvertent and potentially catastrophic military escalation—particularly in interactions between the China Coast Guard (CCG) and the U.S. Coast Guard.” –from “White Hull Diplomacy in Gray Spaces,” Proceedings (Jun 2022).
