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To survive a motion to dismiss, a Plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. Inc. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff pleads facts that allow the court to draw “the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable…for the misconduct alleged”. John Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 US 662, 678 (2009) (emphasis in original). There must be more than a “sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. 680. While courts do not require heightened fact pleading of specifics, a Plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to raise a right to relief above the speculative level. Bell Atlantic, supra, at 550.
In deciding whether the plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted, this court must accept the plaintiff’s allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. See Usher v. City of Los Angeles, California, 828 F.2nd 556, 581 (9th Cir. 1987). However, this court is not required to accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences. In re Gilead Sciences Shareholder Litigation, 536 F.3rd 1049, 1055-1056 (9th Cir. 2008); Charles A. Wright and Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, vol. 4, § 12:01 (5th Ed. 2005).
Defendants have also argued that the complaint should be dismissed for lack of standing under article III of the Constitution and the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §101, et seq. Slater Motion at ¶ 14. To demonstrate standing under the constitution’s case or controversy requirement, a plaintiff must show that it has suffered an injury in fact and that is concrete and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. Laidlaw Environmental Services v. U.S., 528 U.S. 16, 20-1 (2000); Wright and Miller, supra at § 32.01. As always, the starting point for interpreting a statute is the language of the statute itself. Consumer Products Safety Commission v. GTE Sylvania, Incorporated, 447 U. S. 102, 108 (1980).
In this case, the Copyright Act purposefully left “works of authorship” undefined to provide for some flexibility. Garcia vs. Google, Co., Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 741 (9th Circ. 2015). Here, the act does not plainly extend the concept of authorship or statutory standing to animals. To the contrary, there is no mention of animals anywhere in the act. In fact, the supreme court and the ninth circuit have repeatedly referred to “persons” or “human” beings when analyzing authorship under the act. Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3rd 1227, 1241 (2000). Moreover, to qualify as a work of “authorship,” a work must be created by a human being; works that do not satisfy this requirement are not copyrightable. Id. at p. 1247.
Thus, in light of the plain language of the Copyright Act, past judicial interpretations of the act’s authorship requirement, and guidance from the Copyright Office, the plaintiff has no standing to bring this action.
