Please provide short answers (2-4 paragraphs) for 5 out of 8 questions below. So, 5 questions must each MUST be answered in 2-3 paragraphs.
Do not use any AI or Plagiarize anything. Also, please don’t stray away from the main topic of each question. Also, please make sure to sound as fluent and natural as possible. I want other students to be able to understand what they are reading. This paper can be in MLA format. And please cite all sources.
In an question, if the name Axlerod is used, he is the author of the book ”
Axelrod, Robert. (1981). The Evolution of Cooperation” So that’s where you can find the answer for certain questions. Please mainly use that book as your main source of information to answer the questions.
Also these two other books can be used to answer the questions.
Fisher, Len. (2008). Rock, Paper, Scissors: Game Theory in Everyday Life.
Shepsle, Kenneth A. (1996). Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior and Institutions.
1. Why does Axelrod think that an indefinite number of interactions are so central to the possibility of cooperation? Do his conclusions about the necessity of iteration for cooperation make sense to you based on your practical experience?
2. What are the strategic advantages of the “tit-for-tat” strategy? Can tit-for-tat ever “win” in an individual encounter? How “robust” and “resilient” is tit-for-tat in different environments? Why is it so resilient as a strategy?
3. Think about the “rules” Axelrod draws from the success of the tit-for-tat program in Chapter 6. Why do these rules seem to facilitate success for “players” caught in non-zero-sum competitive situations? How do these rules relate or not relate to your practical experience?
4. In chapters 7 and 8, Axelrod discusses ways in which the environment itself can be changed to facilitate greater cooperation. What changes does he recommend, and why? What role do morals, reputation, and social norms play? Provide practical examples.
5. In what ways does the international relations concept of a “security dilemma” speak to the dilemmas of cooperation? (Make sure to define what the security dilemma is in your answer). Feel free to use examples from the U.S. and Russia over Ukraine, or the U.S. and China over Taiwan, to help elaborate your answer.
6. Describe different cooperative rules/strategies from an ecological or “evolutionary” perspective. What kinds of strategies would you expect to do well over time? Why is the issue of “iteration” so important for cooperation to take root?
7. What are potential problems that arise from game theoretical accounts based on the assumption of individual self-interest? If different individuals have different values and understand their self-interests differently, does this present a problem for game theoretical models? Why? Include a practical example.
8. Describe the difference between relative and absolute gains, and zero-sum and non-zero-sum situations. Provide examples of the difference. If relative gains are important, what are the implications for the theory of cooperation described in Fisher and Axelrod?
