Participation Expectations
For each discussion activity, you are responsible for posting at least one substantive initial response to the discussion questions posed, as well, as a reply to at least two other postings made by your classmates.
Your initial substantive posting should be a thoughtful reflection on at least one aspect of the discussion theme or question posed and can either initiate a line of discussion or be in response to someone else’s posting (i.e., adding your own perspective or additional research to it). Keep in mind that quality is better than quantity and “me too” and “I agree” type postings add little to the conversation. Your postings should demonstrate that you have read and thought about the course material. You are encouraged to reference your course textbook in your postings as well as other relevant outside literature.
Some points to keep in mind:
- Be clear and to the point in your postings.
- Edit your work. Your posts should be coherent and use proper grammar and spelling.
- Keep postings to 300-350 words. Quality is better than quantity.
- Contribute your own thoughts about the material you have read.
- Support your thoughts by referencing the textbook or other outside literature.
- Raise additional questions or points of discussion to stimulate further discussion
- If you have questions, show that you have already tried to find a solution.
- Respect the viewpoints of your peers. Ask for clarification if you don’t understand a point. Assume good intentions.
- Use the proper terminology introduced in the course readings.
- When using literature in your postings, make sure to provide references in proper APA Style.
- Show respect and sensitivity to peers’ gender, cultural and linguistic background, political, and religious beliefs.
You are strongly encouraged to take the time to review the following documents on writing quality discussion posting and on taking roles in discussions.
PREPARING TO WRITE
1. Read assigned material—critically—and take notes as you read: Who wrote this material (a respected expert? an activist with a specific aim or belief?) Do they have any possible biases? Are studies reliable and valid? (What kind of research was performed?) When was this material written? Are the definitions/conditions/opinions described still accur vant? ate/rele Is an opinion expressed? How might someone disagree? How does this material relate to other concepts and theories you are studying? (Remember, instructors choose readings with a plan in mind—try to imagine why they have assigned this reading) Does the article complement other things you have learned? Is it in opposition? 2. Read and understand the discussion question or topic provided by your instructor • What are you asked to do? (Formulate an opinion? Respond to a question? Explain a concept or theory?) • How are you asked to do this? What kind of information are you expected to include (e.g., supporting quotations or references, examples, etc.) Do you need to bring in outside research? 3. Sort out the finer details • Is there a word maximum? Minimum? (Most posts will be 1‐2 paragraphs maximum). • How many times are you expected to post? (Find out if you are required to post a certain number of times per question, per week, etc.) • How much of your grade is this component worth?Each post? Budget your time accordingly
A.re you expected to respond to other students’ posts? What proportion of original posts versus responses are you asked to provide?
INITIAL POSTS – An initial post is a response to the original question presented by the course instructor, or the opening post on a particular topic (i.e., not responding to other students’ posts). Consider each post a “mini‐thesis,” in which you state a position and provide support for it. If you are responding to a question, be sure to 1. Take a position: Provide a clear answer to the question (incorporate some of the wording of the question in your answer if possible). 2. Offer a reasoned argument: Provide an explanation for your point of view, and use evidence from your text, notes, or outside research (where appropriate) to support your point. 3. Stay focused: End with a summary comment to explain the connection between your evidence and the question (how your evidence proves your point). Your post might also introduce a question or idea that others can follow up on. But make sure you have answered the question first!
Discusssion Marking rubric.
A+ Discussion Post A+
Initial Post
/2.5 points
deliver information that is full of thought, insight, and analysis • make insightful connections to course content • make insightful connections to real-life situations • contain rich and fully developed new ideas, connections, or applications • contain no spelling errors and typos
Question of discussion is –
Use this discussion area to complete the Reflection Activity in Unit 12.
For the final week of the course, you are asked to reflect on your learning process and what you found useful and not so useful. Please share your thoughts and your learning experience with your group on the discussion board.
Refer to the Outline for the specific dates for this discussion and when your initial response should be posted by. Discussion participation expectations can be found in the Assessments section of the course website.
During the week, be sure to spend some time reviewing and responding to the posts of your discussion group members.
- write in 310 words. follow proper guidlibes as given in begning. Use AP7 STYLE OWL PURDE. Provide refrence.
Write in on own words.
Some points to keep in mind:
Be clear and to the point in your postings.
Edit your work. Your posts should be coherent and use proper grammar and spelling.
Keep postings to 300-350 words. Quality is better than quantity.
Contribute your own thoughts about the material you have read.
Support your thoughts by referencing the textbook or other outside literature.
Raise additional questions or points of discussion to stimulate further discussion.
If you have questions, show that you have already tried to find a solution.
Respect the viewpoints of your peers. Ask for clarification if you don’t understand a point. Assume good intentions.
Use the proper terminology introduced in the course readings.
When using literature in your postings, make sure to provide references in proper APA Style.
Show respect and sensitivity to peers’ gender, cultural and linguistic background, political, and religious beliefs.
These are the readings which i find useful are as follows
Readings
In one study conducted in France, 300 women on Facebook were sent a friend request along with a message that contained references to shared similarities of hobbies, birthdate, and interests (Martin, Jacob, & Guéguen, 2013). Three of the following messages were randomly selected to be sent: no mention of the common similarities (i.e., hobbies, birthdate, and interests), one mention of the similarities, and two similarities were mentioned. The results indicated that compliance of the friend request was common when there were two mentions of similarities (Martin et al., 2013). This gives insight into how we select our network on social media: based on similarities.
The power of similar sources in leading to persuasion is one explanation for the nearly $200 million in annual revenue earned by a company you have probably never heard of—Vector Marketing, which sells Cutco kitchen knives. The strategy this company uses is to recruit people (mostly university students) to attend an orientation session in which they learn how to make face‐to‐face sales calls to sell knives. Sellers are encouraged to sell the knives first to family members and friends (supposedly as a way of gaining experience in pitching the product). Then, at the end of these sales presentations, the sellers are told to ask for referrals to other people who might want to buy these knives—and what could be more persuasive than receiving a call about a product that your friend suggested you would want to hear about?
The Tupperware Brands Corporation and their home party was a pioneer in using this technique in the 1950s. Tupperware kitchen and home products are sold at homes, schools, and other community locations where the host invites family, friends, colleagues, and neighbours. The Tupperware representative is also present at these parties and everyone is aware that the host receives a percentage of the sale. The success of this method stems mainly from the act of buying from a friend rather than an unknown salesperson.
CREDIBILITY.
Sources who appear credible, meaning competent and trustworthy, are more persuasive than those who lack credibility (Chaiken & Maheswaran, 1994; Priester & Petty, 2003; Smith, De Houwer, & Nosek, 2012; Verplanken, 1991). This is why doctors are often quoted in advertisements for health‐related products. For children between the ages of 7 and 10, best friends are particularly influential. Barbara Morrongiello and Tess Dawber (2004) from the University of Guelph had children choose between risky or non‐risky alternatives in a variety of play situations. Having made their choice, their best friend was able to persuade them to make the other choice approximately half the time. Peers in general (not just best friends) are also influential with this age group of elementary school‐aged children (Morrongiello & Lasenby‐Lessard, 2007).
We’re also more convinced by sources that we believe are trustworthy, meaning those who don’t have an ulterior motive for convincing us. Thus, if someone tries to convince you to join a health club and you’re aware that the person will receive a month’s free membership if you join, you’re more likely to question his or her credibility as a proponent of the club. Our concern about people’s ulterior motives helps explain why we see expert witnesses who are paid for their testimony as less believable than those who volunteer (Edens et al., 2012).
People who argue unexpected positions—those that seem to go against their own self‐interests—are often especially persuasive because they’re seen as highly credible (Wood & Eagly, 1981). Messages that favour a view that goes against participants’ expectations are seen as more factually based than those that subscribe to the expected side and therefore lead to greater attitude change. In a series of studies conducted in the United States, Taly Reich and Zakary Tormala (2013) examined how contradictions within arguments influenced persuasion.
They found that an individual would most likely be persuaded by a contradiction only when the source was perceived to be from a single, highly credible source.
The credibility of a speaker is particularly influential when people have recently been exposed to another persuasive message (Tormala & Clarkson, 2007). Specifically, when people have just received a persuasive message from a source with low credibility, they’re more persuaded by a message from a moderately credible source than if they had first received a message from a source with high credibility. This study indicates that our evaluation of source credibility is influenced not only by the source’s credentials but also by the credentials of other sources we have recently seen.
Repeated exposure to a persuasive message can also lead individuals to attribute the message to a more credible source that is falsely perceived to exist. In one American study, Danielle Polage (2012) tested how false stories that felt familiar would influence participants into thinking the stories actually were something they read in the news or heard people talking about it. Participants were given five true stories to read (e.g., how drinking tea puts you at a decreased risk of dying if you already had a heart attack), and half of those participants were also given five false stories (e.g., California passing a law that prevents people in debt from opening new credit cards). They were also asked to rate the credibility of each publication. Participants were asked to come back in five weeks where they answered questions about the stories presented initially. The results indicated that those who had read the false stories rated them as more truthful and real rather than something that was fabricated. Additionally, the same participants said that they read and heard of the stories from an outside source, other than the lab. The findings suggest that when one is familiar with a piece of information, one is more likely to think of it as credible or even real.
Even non‐credible sources can become more persuasive over time, a phenomenon known as the sleeper effect (Pratkanis, Greenwald, Leippe, & Baumgardner, 1988). This occurs because over time, people may remember the message, but not remember the speaker. For example, you might read something in Glamour and initially discount it because of its source, but a few months later you might recall the information, but forget that you read it in Glamour and therefore believe it. In one German study about the power of the sleeper effect, participants read an online news article (with anonymous comments in the comments section) and were asked about the article’s persuasiveness (Heinbach, Ziegele, & Quiring, 2018). Participants were 181 undergraduate students. The study examined whether the credibility of the website (credible or non‐credible source) and positivity of the comments (positive or negative comments) influenced participants’ opinions. They found that, similar to traditional discounting cues (source credibility), participants felt that articles with negative comments seemed less persuasive. In terms of the sleeper effect, they found that participants’ opinion of the articles that came with positive comments decreased over time, but not in the negative nor control conditions (Heinbach et al., 2018). The study, however, did not find the sleeper effect in terms of credibility of the source.
sleeper effect – the phenomenon by which a message that initially is not particularly persuasive becomes more persuasive over time because people forget its source
2 nd reading which i find useful is
Vaccination Attitudes
The results of scientific empirical studies show that vaccines are safe and effective in combating the spread of disease. However, there is a segment of the society that believe vaccines are linked to autism or that vaccination is unsafe. Discuss why some hold “anti-vax” attitudes? What is the source of misinformation? Hint: Cognitive biases and Overconfidence are two relevant concepts to explore.You may find the following article and videos helpful as you develop your argument.
- Motta, M., Callaghan, T., & Sylvester, S. (2018). Knowing less but presuming more: Dunning-Kruger effects and the endorsement of anti-vaccine policy attitudes. Social Science & Medicine, 211, 274-281.
- Video from the Washington Post:https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VQti02x57bE
- Vaccines—Calling the Shots Sneak Peek | NOVA: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B8fW-r6cO3M
- FRONTLINE | The Vaccine War | PBS: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VPOrnU3ImxI
- You may find the following article and videos helpful as you develop your argument
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- Motta, M., Callaghan, T., & Sylvester, S. (2018). Knowing less but presuming more: Dunning-Kruger effects and the endorsement of anti-vaccine policy attitudes. Social Science & Medicine, 211, 274-281.
- Reading -3 which i find useful are as follows
- Readings:Readings given below which has to be used
- SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORYDuring our discussion above, you may have noticed that effects such as deindividuation are intragroup processes. However, an important aspect of crowd behaviour—one that was overlooked by Le Bon, Allport, Zimbardo, and others—is its intergroup dimension (Reicher, 1984; Reicher & Potter, 1985). Stephen Reicher, a British psychologist, argued that in many crowd situations, there are at least two groups. This simple point was virtually ignored in all previous theories of crowd behaviour. For example, in the G20 summit demonstration in Hamburg, Germany, there were demonstrators and a large number of police officers, and these two groups were interacting. In other words, each group was acting in response to the behaviour (or even the expected behaviour) of the other group. This occurs even when people are protesting in the absence of another group, such as the police, a rival group of sports fans, or a rival group of political supporters. They’re usually protesting against another group, perhaps a ruling elite. Reicher’s insight has finally moved research into crowd behaviour beyond the “mad or bad” discussions that are over a century old now; he asserted that crowd behaviour is often intergroup behaviour, in terms of which the behaviour can make more sense—it is not simply mad or bad.The other important insight about crowds, which follows from the idea of crowd behaviour as intergroup behaviour, is that people in a crowd do not lose their identity in some way but instead assume a new social identity as a member of a particular group. According to Reicher (1984), people in a crowd, although they may lose some personal identity, adopt (if only temporarily) a stronger sense of social identity. Therefore, in crowds there is a change of identity rather than loss of identity. Reicher’s argument is based on the social identity theory of Tajfel (1982), which we will explain next.This alternative view of crowd behaviour helps explain the behaviour of demonstrators and police in Hamburg, Germany, during the 2017 G20 summit. The police adopted the identity and role of protecting the local and foreign government delegates. This shared identity created norms of conduct in that specific situation. The police acted by dispersing, intimidating, and arresting many demonstrators (who they perceived as a threat to the group they were entrusted with protecting, i.e., the state and non‐demonstrating majority). On the other hand, demonstrators shared a different social identity. They came together for a specific purpose (i.e., protesting against the G20 summit) and reacted to what they perceived as police aggression by targeting police property and vandalizing local shops and businesses (perceiving that the police, as representatives and guardians of the capitalist status quo, had violated their right to peaceful protest). Therefore, although both groups (police and demonstrators) were exposed to the same environment, their group membership (and their expectations of, and the behaviour of, the other group) determined the behaviour they engaged in.In sum, when people are in a group, and that group membership is salient, it’s their group goal and group identity that regulate their behaviour. Additionally, when examining collective behaviour, it’s important to realize that “the crowd” doesn’t exist in isolation; rather it can represent one group and there is often another group involved as well—even if that group isn’t physically present (e.g., in 2019 in London hundreds gathered to protest the king of Brunei’s law that has homosexuals sentenced to death). Therefore, as Brown (2000) notes, to understand what goes on inside a crowd, it’s important to examine crowds from an intergroup perspective. This is not to say that other perspectives are wrong or irrelevant, but to ignore the intergroup aspect of crowd behaviour is to ignore one of its important elements. Social identity theory, as we will now see, helps explain this aspect of crowd behaviour and other social behaviour (see Environmental Connections).According to social identity theory, each person strives to enhance his or her self‐esteem, which is composed of both personal identity and social identity (Tajfel, 1982). Because our group memberships influence our thoughts, feelings, and behaviour, we’re motivated to affiliate with successful groups as a way of increasing our own feelings of self‐worth (Smith & Tyler, 1997; Snyder, Lassegard, & Ford, 1986). In line with this, Van De Rijt, Akin, Willer, and Feinberg (2016) conducted a study in Alabama, the United States, that employing fake political petitions demonstrated that people, subconsciously, like to affiliate themselves with a popular political party, or a successful group. In turn, people can feel good about themselves by calling attention to their connection to successful people or groups (e.g., Indian Canadians who see the success of comedian Russell Peters, or those affected by cancer who watched Jack Layton became the leader of the official opposition while fighting the disease). In sum, people favour their in‐groups over their out‐groups in order to enhance their self‐esteem. Figure 9.2 presents the theory.social identity theory – a theory that posits that each person strives to enhance his or her self‐esteem, which is composed of two parts: a personal identity and a social identitySocial identity theory also posits that threats to one’s self‐esteem increase the need for in‐group favouritism (Tajfel, 1982). Therefore, people whose group is threatened and those who feel bad about themselves develop more in‐group identification and are more likely to derogate out‐group members (Forgas & Fiedler, 1996; Marques, Abrams, Paez, & Martinez‐Taboada, 1998). This view is sustained by Martiny and Rubin (2016), who showed that people sometimes join groups to increase their self‐esteem and, at times, their social status. Therefore, people are motivated to see their group in a positive light and favour their group. In‐group favouritism and out‐group derogation are particularly likely to occur under specific conditions—if status of the group is being threatened, if the status of the individual within a group is being threatened, and if the group is small.Each participant came into the lab to take part in a study on performance and was given an extremely boring task to complete—to move each of 48 spools of thread a quarter turn in one direction, then another quarter turn, then another quarter turn, and then back again to their starting position, for an entire hour. Then, after the participant was finally told that the experiment was finished, the experimenter asked for a favour. He explained that this experiment was not really on “measures of performance,” as the participant had been told, but was actually on the influence of expectations about a task on how people see the task. The participant was further told that, being in the control condition, he or she was not given any prior expectation about what to expect, but the next participant, who was due to arrive any minute, was in the “positive expectation” condition. Moreover, the experimenter told that the research assistant who was supposed to give the next student the positive expectations was running late, and it would be appreciated if the participant would be willing to stay and just tell the next participant that the experiment was really fun and exciting. Some of the participants were offered $20 (a considerable sum in the 1950s) to lie to the next participants, whereas others were offered only $1 to lie. All participants agreed to lie, and after doing so, they were asked by the experimenter what they thought of the experiment (on a 1 to 25 scale, with 1 indicating very unenjoyable).What do you think happened? Contrary to reward theory, those who were given $20 admitted that they found the task boring, as did those who were given no money. But what about those who were given $1 to lie? As shown in Figure 5.4, they actually claimed they sort of liked the task!This experiment demonstrates that receiving insufficient justification for engaging in an attitude‐discrepant behaviour can lead to attitude change. In other words, if you engage in a behaviour that is counter‐attitudinal, you must make some kind of a justification. If the external justification is high (“Well, I did get $20”), you will attribute your behaviour to external factors and not change your attitude (“Boy, that task really was boring, but worth it for $20”), but if the external justification is low ($1), you must explain your behaviour using internal factors (“Well, I must have at least liked the task a little”).Although the Festinger and Carlsmith (1959) study demonstrated the negative effects of insufficient justification—that people convince themselves they like something they didn’t really enjoy—this principle can also be used to promote positive behaviours. For example, researchers at Trinity University in the United States examined how cognitive dissonance techniques could be employed to prevent eating disordered behaviours (Black Becker et al., 2010). Participants were 102 female students who had eating disorders. All participants attended two sessions related to the thin‐ideal body and received homework brainstorming the costs of pursuing the thin‐ideal. It was found that when women engaged in this activity, their eating disordered behaviours decreased (Black Becker et al., 2010). In this way, the participants felt less justification for continuing to engage in ongoing eating‐disordered behaviours after engaging in activities to prevent these unhealthy behaviours. Similarly, and as described in the following Health Connections box, cognitive dissonance can be used to promote change in unhealthy behaviours in those with clinical diagnoses.GRIT STRATEGYThe strategy known as GRIT (which stands for graduated and reciprocated initiatives in tension‐reduction) refers to a particular approach to resolving conflict that involves unilateral and persistent efforts in order to establish trust and cooperation between opposing parties (Linskold & Han, 1988; Osgood, 1962). In this case, one party announces its intention to reduce conflict and invites the other party to reciprocate. Then the first party carries out its tension‐reducing activities as planned, even if there is no immediate response. This increases the party’s credibility and may put pressure on the other party to respond accordingly. Once the other party acts, the first party quickly reciprocates. If the other party retaliates, the first party then quickly retaliates at the same level.GRIT (graduated and reciprocated initiatives in tension‐reduction) – a strategy for resolving conflict that involves unilateral and persistent efforts to establishing trust and cooperation between opposing partiesGRIT STRATEGYThe strategy known as GRIT (which stands for graduated and reciprocated initiatives in tension‐reduction) refers to a particular approach to resolving conflict that involves unilateral and persistent efforts in order to establish trust and cooperation between opposing parties (Linskold & Han, 1988; Osgood, 1962). In this case, one party announces its intention to reduce conflict and invites the other party to reciprocate. Then the first party carries out its tension‐reducing activities as planned, even if there is no immediate response. This increases the party’s credibility and may put pressure on the other party to respond accordingly. Once the other party acts, the first party quickly reciprocates. If the other party retaliates, the first party then quickly retaliates at the same level.GRIT (graduated and reciprocated initiatives in tension‐reduction) – a strategy for resolving conflict that involves unilateral and persistent efforts to establishing trust and cooperation between opposing partiesFIGURE 9.5 FORMING A NEW GROUP WITH CROSS‐CATEGORICAL MEMBERSHIPParticipants who use the GRIT strategy are more likely to reach optimal agreements and feel differently about their interaction partner than those who use competitive strategies.One dramatic and effective example of GRIT was the disarmament of FARC, a Marxist group in Colombia who has engaged in armed struggle with the Colombian government for decades. FARC handed in thousands of weapons. When President Juan Manuel Santos came into power, he began secret talks with FARC commanders, which led to negotiations and a peace accord (Voa News, 2017). Since the peace accord, there has been a reduction in homicide and kidnapping rates across Colombia (Biettel, 2018).
In turn, people in collectivistic cultures should put less blame on obese people for their weight, and thereby show lower levels of prejudice and discrimination than people in individualistic cultures, who would be expected to place greater emphasis on the role of personal responsibility in determining weight. For example, a study that was conducted in China examined the attitudes of 297 nurse practitioners toward overweight patients. The researchers found that participants generally had neutral to slightly positive attitudes toward overweight patients, and they believed that being overweight was beyond the individual’s control. In comparison, in a cross‐cultural study that examined prejudicial attitudes against overweight individuals in the United States, Canada, Iceland, and Australia, it was found that participants from all countries attributed being overweight as related to having poor willpower and self‐control (Puhl et al., 2015).
In a longitudinal study consisting of 3,362 U.S. children from the fifth to eighth grade, researchers found that an increase in body size was associated with teacher’s negative perceptions of students (Kenney, Gortmaker, Davidson, & Austin, 2015). For girls, there was a marked reduction in their competence of reading ability and for boys, there was a reduction in their math ability. The results of this study demonstrate how stigmatizing attitudes against overweight children may influence school climate and teacher’s treatment of children. This study provides insight as to how stigmatizing attitudes against overweight children might potentially influence school climate and teacher’s treatment of children.There are, however, cultures where carrying more weight is clearly valued. For example, it has been reported for VICE News that in rural Mauritania young girls, starting from the age of eight, are force fed because fat women are traditionally viewed as more desirable. This reflects the belief that fat women are symbols of wealth and beauty and can find good husbands.STEREOTYPES ABOUT WOMEN.Cross‐cultural psychologists have examined development and socialization of gender stereotypes in many nations. One study of 3,323 participants from 26 countries found that women are perceived to be higher in traits of warmth, positive emotions, and vulnerability. On the other hand, men are perceived to be assertive, impulsive, and excitement seeking (Löckenhoff et al., 2014). Gender stereotype learning begins by age 5, accelerates in early school years, and peaks during adolescence (Best, 2010; Blum, Mmari, & Moreau, 2017; Williams & Best, 1990). Socialization within a culture plays a critical role in gender stereotype development. In a given culture, parents’ expectations influence children’s sex‐role behaviours, and children’s gender stereotypes reflect those of their parents (Best, 2004, 2010; Blum et al., 2017). Nonetheless, there are cultural differences in gender stereotypes and knowledge of stereotypical masculine or feminine behaviours. Hofstede (2001) found that in countries where the dominant culture is feminine, gender roles are less clearly delineated than in predominantly masculine countries. It’s more acceptable, therefore, for a father to stay at home and be a “house husband” in Sweden or the Netherlands than in Japan or Italy.Researchers Peter Glick and Susan Fiske developed a theory of sexism that distinguishes between hostile sexism and benevolent sexism, which we saw earlier, and tested their theory in 19 different countries (Glick & Fiske, 2001; Glick et al., 2004; Glick & Fiske, 2011; Glick, Berdahl, & Alonso, 2018). In some ways, sexist beliefs are very similar across different cultures:Hostile and benevolent sexism are correlated in all cultures, with hostile sexism predicting negative traits (e.g., uncooperative, rude, indecisive) and benevolent sexism predicting positive traits (e.g., cooperative, courteous, decisive).Although women show more rejection of hostile sexism than do men across cultures, both men and women commonly endorse benevolent sexism.Both men and women see men in more negative ways across cultures, but also see men as having more power.These hostile and benevolent attitudes toward women reflect and support gender inequality by describing men as inherently dominant.In other ways, cross‐cultural comparisons reveal different beliefs about women. Specifically, mean scores on both types of sexism in a given culture are inversely related to gender equality (i.e., there is less equality where there is more sexism) in such measures as women’s empowerment (e.g., representation in high‐powered roles in a society) and development (e.g., longevity, education, standards of living; Glick et al., 2004). In highly sexist cultures, women are also more likely to endorse benevolent sexism, and even more than men do in such cultures.This finding suggests that women may accept benevolent sexism as the lesser of two evils when they’re in a culture with generally negative attitudes toward women, and may be motivated to endorse this type of sexism as a way of gaining protection from men. Unfortunately, benevolent sexism can legitimize hostile sexism by allowing men to hold condescending attitudes toward women and can thereby undermine women’s efforts to achieve true equality.This perception of women as needing protection, and as part of the property of their families, can have dangerous, and even deadly, consequences. The term “honour killing” refers to an act of violence, usually murder, committed by male family members against female family members who are seen as having brought dishonour upon the family. This dishonour can be caused by refusing to enter into an arranged marriage, dating or marrying a person outside of their family’s ethnic and/or religious community, seeking a divorce, or committing adultery. These killings are supported not only by men in the family, but also by other women, due to the perception in these cultures that the family is the property and asset of men. Cultures in which “honour” is highly valued are also more inclined to tolerate violence against women within a relationship. In a comparison of “high honour” (“Latinos” and “Southern Anglos” in the United States, and Chileans) and “low honour” (“Northern Anglos” in the United States and “Anglo‐Canadians”), a combined Canadian and American research team including Ruth Grandon from the University of Waterloo found that participants in their study from honour cultures were relatively more favourable toward a woman who stayed in an abusive relationship, and rated the husband and his abusive actions more positively when the conflict was jealousy related (perceived flirting), than did participants from subcultures without strong honour traditions (Vandello, Cohen, Grandon, & Franiuk, 2009).Honour killings can occur even in cases in which the woman has no responsibility for the “dishonouring” behaviour. For example, in some cultures a single woman who is raped will be unable to garner a bride price if she marries. Moreover, women who are raped can be seen as worthless burdens that bring dishonour to their family—and may even be killed for this act of “allowing” themselves to be raped.Next readingStroessner, Hamilton and Mackie (1992) examined the role of affect in promoting the illusory correlation effect. In this study participants’ affective states were manipulated by showing them a videotape that induced a positive, negative, or neutral affective states. The positive mood video showed the performance of a comedian and the negative mood video presented a discussion of a child abuse case that resulted in the death of a child. Participants in a neutral mood condition watched a videotape of a National Geographic program concerning the exploration of a dormant volcano.After viewing one of the videotapes, participants read 24 positive and 12 negative descriptions of behaviour performed by members of two groups. Whereas members of Group A had performed 24 of the behaviours, members of Group B had performed 12 of the behaviours. The ratio of desirable to undesirable behaviours, however, was identical for each group. Two thirds of the 24 behaviours of the members of Group A, and two thirds of the 12 behaviours of the members of Group B, were positive. Evidence of an illusory correlation effect would be present if participants overestimated the frequency of undesirable behaviours among members of Group B as compared to members of Group A.Stroessner et al. found that the illusory correlation effect was present among members of the neutral mood condition. Participants in this condition overestimated the negative behaviour of Group B, and rated the members of Group B as less likeable than members of Group A. The illusory correlation effect was not in evidence, though, among members of the positive or negative mood conditions. One explanation is related to the different effects of mood on information processing. Whereas negative mood leads to more elaborate and careful cognitive processing, good mood is associated with more superficial cognitive processing. Participants in the negative mood condition were perhaps not swayed by the illusory correlation inducement because they correctly perceived that the information about both groups was equivalent. Participants in the positive mood condition may not have processed the information enough to be swayed by the information presented to them. Social Influence Approach to Stereotypes
Arguably, social cognition approaches have overlooked the social forces that are also involved in stereotype formation and use. Indeed, widespread prejudice, discrimination, and intergroup conflict must, at least in part, result from stereotypes that are shared within groups. Turner et al. (1987) and Leyens et al. (1994) point out that the process of stereotyping is quite complex. Although we may respond to another based on race or religion, invoking racially based or religiously based stereotypes, a person is more than simply a skin colour or a religious denomination. A person is also tall or short, young or old, holds a particular kind of occupation, etc. The motivation to stereotype on the basis of group memberships such as ethnicity or religion may be derived from processes related to our own group membership. In this sense, much of the recent research in stereotyping and intergroup conflict has returned to Tajfel and Turner’s focus on intragroup processes as a way of understanding intergroup outcomes.Interestingly, it appears that stereotypes shared among group members derive not from the common experiences of group members, but instead from shared group membership. Members of the same group tend to interpret outgroup information in the same way. For example, members of an ingroup may share a stereotype of outgroup members as being lazy not because they have had similar experiences of the behaviour of members of the outgroup but, instead, because of how membership within their own group leads them to perceive the conduct of others. Specifically, through the process of informational social influence, people actively seek agreement with ingroup members about beliefs about members of an outgroup (Haslam, 1997). Those with whom an individual shares group membership act as sources that consensually validate subjectively held beliefs. Where there is disagreement between an individual and other group members, individuals will be motivated to change their views to make them consistent with those of the group. Through this process, identified by Turner (1991) as social reality testing, we become confident in the correctness of our beliefs.These processes were investigated in a study by Haslam et al. (1997) in which Australian students were asked to make judgments about the percentage of a group of Australians (an ingroup) and Americans (an outgroup) to whom a list of characteristics could be applied. Before making these judgments, participants were given feedback about how other people had described these two groups (e.g., Americans are extremely nationalistic, materialistic and ostentatious, and Australians are happy-go-lucky, pleasure-loving and sportsman-like). Whereas some participants were told these descriptions were provided by other students (an ingroup), others were told that these descriptions came from “closed-minded authoritarians” (an outgroup). The study found that the Australian students were more willing to make stereotypic distinctions between Australians and Americans when these distinctions were supported by feedback from other ingroup members (other students) and were less inclined to make such distinctions when provided the same feedback from an outgroup (closed-minded authoritarians). In other words, information that supported stereotypes led to the expression of those stereotypes only when this support was provided by an ingroup, but not when it was provided by an outgroup.In a second study, Haslam and his associates examined if a more clearly defined ingroup would enhance the effects observed in the first study. Therefore, in addition to feedback from an ill-defined ingroup (other students), and an outgroup (closed-minded authoritarians) they added a third more clearly defined ingroup: students who were described as not prejudiced. As shown in Figure 9.1, the more clearly defined ingroup greatly increased the likelihood that subjects would draw stereotypic distinctions between the traits of Americans and Australians.There are several theoretical models examining stereotype and prejudice. Patricia Devine (1989) proposed a model that explains the nature of contemporary forms of prejudice. In her model, the dissociation model, Devine distinguishes between two types of information: (1) stereotypes and (2) prejudiced personal beliefs (or attitudes) about group members. A stereotype is general knowledge that is associated with a particular group. Prejudiced personal beliefs are endorsement or acceptance of the stereotype. Devine argues that being knowledgeable about the stereotype does not necessarily mean that one endorses the stereotype. This is because stereotype is governed by automatic cognitive process while prejudice personal beliefs are governed by controlled process. Automatic processes are activated spontaneously and by presence of relevant cues in environment. In contrast, controlled processes are activated intentionally and by active attention to environmental cures.Devine (1989) argues that our default response is automatic activation of stereotype because stereotypes typically have a long socialization history and have been frequently activated, Devine (1989) argued that they can be automatically activated, providing a default basis for responding in the presence of members of the stereotyped group or their symbolic equivalent. So, low prejudiced people and high prejudiced people are equally susceptible to the automatic activation and use of stereotypes because they are equally knowledgeable about the cultural stereotype. In contrast to stereotypes, personal beliefs about a target group are often developed after the initial, early learning of the stereotype. These beliefs are less accessible cognitive structures than stereotypes and rely on controlled processing for their activation.Therefore, the default response even among high prejudiced people is a stereotype-based response. But, low prejudiced people can inhibit stereotype-based response by bringing their personal beliefs to mind. Devine, Monteith, Zuwerink, & Elliot (1991) proposed a process in order to inhibit a stereotype-based response and replace it with a desirable response. This process is depicted in Figure 9.2.
Figure 9.2: Dissociation Model.
Source: Devine, P.G., Monteith, M. J., Zuwerink, J. R., & Elliot, A. J. (1991). Prejudice with and without compunction. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 60, 817-830.The starting point of the process is established by non-prejudiced standards. This refers to defining oneself as low prejudiced. The solid lines in the figure indicate the path the people follow at early stages of the prejudice reduction process, such as establishing and internalizing non-prejudiced self-identity, contact with a group member, and the automatic activation of a stereotype. During these early phases, contact with members of a stereotype will lead to the automatic activation of the stereotype and its associated negative affect. It is suggested that at early stages, low prejudiced people experience discrepancies between their no prejudiced standards and their actual responses. That is, their response is more prejudice than they would like it to be. This leads to feelings of negative feelings such as guilt and self-criticism.The model indicates that by focusing attention to discrepant behaviour and no prejudiced standards, alternative responses would be considered. Therefore, on future occasions, people should follow the dashed lines. This means that during later phases, people would avoid discrepancies and feeling guilt instead they generate responses that are consistent with their no prejudiced beliefs and standards. According to the model, people can benefit from their failure experiences and can make progress in learning to respond consistently with their no prejudiced standards.In summary, the model is based on evaluating response (compare actual response to personal standards), activating discrepancy and negative self-directed affect (guilt), and activation self-regulatory cycle, and building an association between punishment (guilt) and stereotype use.Stroessner, Hamilton and Mackie (1992) examined the role of affect in promoting the illusory correlation effect. In this study participants’ affective states were manipulated by showing them a videotape that induced a positive, negative, or neutral affective states. The positive mood video showed the performance of a comedian and the negative mood video presented a discussion of a child abuse case that resulted in the death of a child. Participants in a neutral mood condition watched a videotape of a National Geographic program concerning the exploration of a dormant volcano.
After viewing one of the videotapes, participants read 24 positive and 12 negative descriptions of behaviour performed by members of two groups. Whereas members of Group A had performed 24 of the behaviours, members of Group B had performed 12 of the behaviours. The ratio of desirable to undesirable behaviours, however, was identical for each group. Two thirds of the 24 behaviours of the members of Group A, and two thirds of the 12 behaviours of the members of Group B, were positive. Evidence of an illusory correlation effect would be present if participants overestimated the frequency of undesirable behaviours among members of Group B as compared to members of Group A.Stroessner et al. found that the illusory correlation effect was present among members of the neutral mood condition. Participants in this condition overestimated the negative behaviour of Group B, and rated the members of Group B as less likeable than members of Group A. The illusory correlation effect was not in evidence, though, among members of the positive or negative mood conditions. One explanation is related to the different effects of mood on information processing. Whereas negative mood leads to more elaborate and careful cognitive processing, good mood is associated with more superficial cognitive processing. Participants in the negative mood condition were perhaps not swayed by the illusory correlation inducement because they correctly perceived that the information about both groups was equivalent. Participants in the positive mood condition may not have processed the information enough to be swayed by the information presented to them.next readingStroessner, Hamilton and Mackie (1992) examined the role of affect in promoting the illusory correlation effect. In this study participants’ affective states were manipulated by showing them a videotape that induced a positive, negative, or neutral affective states. The positive mood video showed the performance of a comedian and the negative mood video presented a discussion of a child abuse case that resulted in the death of a child. Participants in a neutral mood condition watched a videotape of a National Geographic program concerning the exploration of a dormant volcano. After viewing one of the videotapes, participants read 24 positive and 12 negative descriptions of behaviour performed by members of two groups. Whereas members of Group A had performed 24 of the behaviours, members of Group B had performed 12 of the behaviours. The ratio of desirable to undesirable behaviours, however, was identical for each group. Two thirds of the 24 behaviours of the members of Group A, and two thirds of the 12 behaviours of the members of Group B, were positive. Evidence of an illusory correlation effect would be present if participants overestimated the frequency of undesirable behaviours among members of Group B as compared to members of Group A.Stroessner et al. found that the illusory correlation effect was present among members of the neutral mood condition. Participants in this condition overestimated the negative behaviour of Group B, and rated the members of Group B as less likeable than members of Group A. The illusory correlation effect was not in evidence, though, among members of the positive or negative mood conditions. One explanation is related to the different effects of mood on information processing. Whereas negative mood leads to more elaborate and careful cognitive processing, good mood is associated with more superficial cognitive processing. Participants in the negative mood condition were perhaps not swayed by the illusory correlation inducement because they correctly perceived that the information about both groups was equivalent. Participants in the positive mood condition may not have processed the information enough to be swayed by the information presented to them. These are the readings which i find useful are as follows Reading which i donot feel useful Reading- 1 The public behaviour of people is often different from their private behaviour. In some cases, the mere presence of others may spur us to behave differently than we would in private. There are times when the presence of others has an inhibitory effect on our behaviour. We may fail to perform, or shy away from performing, particular behaviours when in front of an audience. At other times, when in a group, people engage in dangerous or extreme behaviours that they would not consider performing alone. Why are there such discrepancies in public vs. private behaviour? Triplett’s Theory of Dynamogenesis
Floyd Allport (1924) coined the term social facilitation in reference to the improved performance that is sometimes observed when an individual performs a task in the presence of others, in comparison to when the individual performs the task alone. William Triplett first noted this effect. Triplett was a bicycling enthusiast and he noted a pattern in the results of the Racing Board of the League of American Wheelmen. Riders appeared to post the fastest times when they were in head-to-head competition and posted the slowest times when they were racing against the clock. Riders who raced against the clock, but who were paced by another rider, posted times that fell between these two conditions. To account for these observations Triplett proposed a theory of dynamogenesis. He hypothesized that the presence of others improves performance by increasing motivation. Triplett tested his theory by performing what is generally considered to be the first experiment in social psychology. He instructed children to wind up fishing reels. The children performed this task both alone and in competition with one another. Triplett found that 20 of the children wound the reels faster when in competition, and only 10 wound faster when alone.After the publication of these results in 1897, other psychologists began performing similar experiments to determine if it was the competition between the children in Triplett’s study, or simply the presence of others, that accounted for his findings. Research on this issue produced some contradictory findings. Studies found that both competitors and passive audiences could at times facilitate, and at other times inhibit, performance (Wilke & Van Kippenberg, 1996).A second issue concerned the level of difficulty or complexity of the task performed. In general, the results of this research suggest that the performance of simple tasks was improved when people performed the tasks in groups (Dashiel, 1930). When more complex tasks were examined, such as refuting philosophical arguments, performance was qualitatively poorer in the presence of others (Allport, 1924). Triplett’s theory was not able to account for these contradictory findings. The study of social facilitation dwindled after the 1930s, perhaps due these unexplained findings. This situation changed years later when, in 1965, Robert Zajonc proposed a new theory of social facilitation.
Zajonc’s Social Learning Theory of Social Facilitation
Zajonc’s (1965) theory of social facilitation was based on findings from learning theory and the concept of the dominant response. A dominant response is one that is easy to perform or well rehearsed. Zajonc proposed that the mere presence of other people is physiologically arousing (analogous to increasing motivation). This arousal increases the likelihood that a dominant response will occur in a particular situation. Zajonc proposed that this increase in arousal is an innate response to the presence of others. For easy tasks, correct responses are dominant and, therefore, an audience facilitates performance of the correct response. For complex tasks, the wrong answers are dominant and, therefore, audiences facilitate performance of the incorrect response. Simple or well-learned tasks should be performed better in the presence of other people, whereas performance on difficult or poorly learned tasks, where the dominant response is not the correct one, ought to be worse when others are around.This simple and elegant idea seemed to account for all of the human data gathered in the 20s and 30s and for the results of a variety of animal studies as well. It also fits well with the feelings of professional athletes and performers who sometimes say they have difficulty getting “psyched up” or motivated when audiences are small. If, as should be the case for accomplished athletes, skillful performance is their dominant response, an audience should bring out the best in them. Canadian sprinter Donovan Bailey ran his fastest race and set a world record at the Olympic games in 1996 when thousands of people were watching in the stadium, and millions more were watching the race on television. When we are unsure of ourselves, though, an audience can be a quick route to embarrassment. As Canadian hockey player Wayne Gretzky put it when explaining his poor golf score at a tournament, “everyone knows that it is harder to do the things you don’t do well in front of other people.”
Other Theories of Social Facilitation
Zajonc proposed that it is the mere presence of others that causes the increased level of arousal that facilitates the performance of dominant responses. A number of theories proposed since have identified alternative explanations for how the presence of others affects performance. Cottrell (1968) proposed that increased arousal in the presence of others was a learned response— not an innate one as Zajonc had proposed. Specifically, the presence of others increases arousal due to the learned concern that an audience will evaluate our performance (i.e., evaluation apprehension). Those who argue Cottrell’s position would say that the presence of an infant would neither facilitate nor impair performance because we should not be concerned that an infant might evaluate our performance. According to Zajonc’s theory, the presence of an infant would produce social facilitation effects on performance.The results of studies investigating social facilitation support both explanations. For example, Cottrell et al. (1968) found that a well-learned response was facilitated when observers were present but not when observers were present and blindfolded. Markus (1978), on the other hand, found that the mere presence of an uninterested (i.e., non-evaluative) observer facilitated a well-learned response (changing into familiar clothes), but interfered with the performance of a more novel response (changing into unfamiliar clothes).Sanders and colleagues (Sanders, Baron & Moore, 1978; Sanders, 1981) proposed that the presence of others is distracting because people make noise, move, or make approving and disapproving gestures. These distractions create a conflict between attending to the distracting audience and attending to the demands of the task at hand. Although distraction should impair performance on complex and simple tasks alike, Sanders contends that the added distraction from an audience increases the performer’s drive, or arousal, and facilitates the performance of a dominant response. Later, Baron (1986) revised this approach by replacing arousal with the concept of information overload. When distracted from a task by an over-stimulating environment, people focus their attention more strongly on the task at hand. This focused attention may explain improved performance on some tasks in the presence of an audience.
