MLA Format, 12 font TImes New Roman, 1 inch margins
In his article “Sensations and Brain Processes,” J.J.C. Smart’s version of physicalism (the theory that mental states are identical with brain states) is the claim that mental states (including consciousness and conscious states like the sensation of seeing a yellow flower) just happen to be brain states (the world could have been such that mental states were not brain states, and were not physical, but it turns out that they are). See pg. 144. He holds that — as it did happen to turn out — mental states are nothing over and above brain states (so his physicalism is a reduction of mental states to brain states). But he also holds that the reduction does not mean something as strong as we might think — we don’t need to translate every statement about mental states to one about brain states (we can talk about mental states and brain states each with their own concepts and logic, like we can talk about nations and citizens, each with their own concepts and logic). Is this account sufficient to give an explanation of how mental states are related to physical states? (Don’t think about whether Smart’s claim is true — just whether or not it is a sufficient explanation). Or must we — like Chalmers thinks — also explain WHY brain states give rise to mental states in order to explain how the conscious features of mental states reduce to brain states? Give an argument for whether or not Smart’s account is sufficient to explain the way in which mental states relate to brain states. Remember that there are no right answers — only the quality of your arguments and writing.
