Below is an argument by Peter Singer that I am presenting in premise-conclusion format. Your task it to read his argument and respond to it. Do you agree with his final conclusion? If so, why? If not, where do you see the flaw in his reasoning? To properly respond, you need to choose a premise or conclusion and explain why it works/fails to work or why the premises don’t properly support the conclusion, etc.
500 word minimum.
Breakdown of Peter Singer’s argument in “Famine, Affluence, and Morality” in a premise-conclusion format:
Premise 1: Suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are bad.
Premise 2: If it is in our power to prevent something bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it.
Supporting Example: If I am walking past shallow pond and see a child drowning in it, I ought to wade in and pull the child out. This will mean getting my clothes muddy, but this is insignificant compared to the death of the child.
Premise 3: It is within our power to prevent suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care without sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance.
Premise 4: By donating to aid agencies, we can prevent suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care without sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance.
Supporting Claim: The money we spend on luxuries, such as going out to restaurants or buying new clothes, could be donated to aid agencies that provide essential resources to those in need.
Conclusion 1: Therefore, we ought to donate to aid agencies to prevent suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care.
Premise 5: The moral obligation to prevent suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care applies regardless of physical proximity or the number of people who can also help.
Supporting Claim: The fact that others can help does not diminish our own moral obligation. Just as our obligation to save the drowning child is not lessened by the presence of other potential rescuers, our obligation to aid the suffering is not diminished by the presence of other potential donors.
Conclusion 2: The fact that there are others who could help does not reduce our own moral obligation to donate to aid agencies.
Premise 6: Our traditional moral categories and common intuitions about charity and duty are insufficient and need to be re-evaluated in light of the above conclusions.
Conclusion 3: We need to fundamentally change our conception of moral duty to include substantial and ongoing aid to those suffering from lack of food, shelter, and medical care.
By structuring the argument in this way, Singer concludes that affluent individuals have a strong moral obligation to assist those suffering from famine and poverty, and that failing to do so is morally wrong.
