In a paper of eight to twelve double-spaced pages in length, use a rationalist-functionalist approach to
examine institutional design within a post-World War II international regime (e.g., the nuclear
nonproliferation regime), observing at least two specific cases within the regime (e.g., Seabed Arms
Control Treaty, 1971–present and International Court of Justice, 1945–present).
1
Begin this assignment by selecting [i] the regime (i.e., issue area) you will be studying and [ii] the cases
(i.e., specific treaty(-ies), organization(s), UN organ(s) or agency(-ies)) you will be observing. Note that the
case specification must include the period of time during which you will be observing institutional
structures within the regime (see above).
2 Plan ahead in selecting your cases, since in your second paper
you will be observing the functioning of the institutions you have selected within [iii] a specific case of
interstate interaction (e.g., dispute between the United Kingdom and the Marshall Islands, 2014–2016).
Begin your analysis by [1] identifying and coding the problem condition (i.e., values on the independent
variable) by observing the set of cooperation problems that the treaty(-ies), organization(s), organ(s), or
agency(-ies) would be designed to address (see Rittberger et al. 2019: 30). Then, assuming the actors that
created the treaty, organization, organ, or agency were rational, generate hypotheses predicting [2a] the
expected functions (i.e., the causal mechanism) of institutional arrangements designed to address such
problems and [2b] the corresponding institutional design features (i.e., values on the dependent
variable, such as “high” or “low”) that would provide such functions (considering both formalization and
legalization). Finally, [3] evaluate your hypotheses by coding observed institutional design features
(i.e., values on the dependent variable) and [4] assessing the manner and extent to which the
institutional arrangements you have selected were designed to function in the manner that you have
predicted. In other words, compare expected (i.e. hypothesized) and observed institutional design features
as a means of evaluating rational design hypotheses, using evidence from the case. To the extent that
expected and observed design features align, there is evidence in support of the rationalist-functionalist
approach. To the extent that they do not align, [5] consider the discrepancy and what might account for it,
including alternative theoretical approaches such as realism and/or constructivism.
Your analysis should be developed thoroughly, presented clearly, and supported by appropriate references
to the assigned readings and other sources. Draw upon assigned readings (explicitly and extensively) to
structure your analysis and use outside research to provide evidence needed to evaluate your
hypotheses. Ci Your paper
must be submitted in a serif font (such as Times New Roman) of size 11 or 12 with 1” margins on all sides
and a page number on each page. The paper should be submitted via email as a Microsoft Word document
(.docx). The filename of the electronic version must include the name of the student submitting it.
Here is a guide the professor posted about the rationalist functionalist approach: Rationalist – Functionalist Approach to Institutional Design
1. Specify the problem condition (Rittberger et al. 2019; Oye 1985)
• Payoff Structure
• Number of Players
▪ [Negotiation Costs]
▪ Information Costs
▪ (other) Transaction Costs
• (lack of) Iteration
• Issue Area
▪ Sovereignty Costs (Abbott and Snidal 2000)
▪ Situational Context (Lipson 1984)
▪ Relative Gains (Mearsheimer 1994/95)
▪ Ideological Context (Keohane 1998)
2. Identify expected institutional functions
(Oye 1985; Rittberger et al. 2019; Keohane 1982; Keohane 1998; Abbott et al. 2000;
Abbott and Snidal 1998; Murphy 2018; Keohane 1997; Abbott and Snidal 2000; Snidal
and Tamm 2023; Vabulas and Snidal 2013; Raustiala 1997; Keck and Sikkink 1999)
• Rules / Procedures
• Transparency / Monitoring / Surveillance
• Iteration
• Reputation / Selection
• Focal Points
• Side Payments / Issue Linkage
• Representation / Accountability
• Mediation / Arbitration / Adjudication
• Enforcement
• Implementation / Pooling / Burden Sharing
• Norm Emergence / Norm Transmission / Norm Internalization
3. Predict expected institutional design features
• Formalization (Abbott and Snidal 1998; Vabulas and Snidal 2013)
▪ Centralization (see also Natsios 1995)
▪ Independence
• Legalization (Abbott et al. 2000; Abbott and Snidal 2000; Murphy 2018)
▪ Obligation
▪ Precision
▪ Delegation
▪ Asymmetric Bargains (Stein 1984; Ikenberry 2001)
4. Evaluate observed institutional design features
5. Discuss findings and consider implications
I thought it would be best to Do it regarding sanctions or counter terrorism and not use the examples listed in the instructions. Please use sources by the authors listed above. the citation style is APSA and sources are from JSTOR.
