The Slate Magazine is an online magazine dealing
with various topical issues. I have extracted a portion of some correspondence
between Ben Wattenburg and Kenneth Hill from the magazine in which they debate
the world population situation. The exchanges reproduced here are just two of
an eight part set. At the time of this correspondence, Ben Wattenberg was a
senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute and Kenneth Hill was a
professor and director of the Hopkins Population Center at Johns Hopkins University.
Read the correspondence and write a brief very well-organized essay (NO MORE THAN
TWO PAGES) indicating what the debate is
about, what evidence each person uses for support, whose side you find more
convincing and why? Please note that the
assignments will be graded for both content and completeness of the answer
(what you say), as well as clarity, linguistic correctness and organization
(how you say it). Assignment should be
typed in double space and very well organized, with paragraphs, and should have an introduction
and conclusion. If you cite and reference external material, you must use ASA
style. See the assignment for the ASA style guidelines. Once you are done, go
to the week 10 folder in blackboard and follow instructions to upload your
essay.
Dear Kenneth Hill, Posted: Wednesday, January 7, 1998, at 12:30 AM PT
My recent article
in the New York Times Magazine was titled “The Population Explosion
is Over.” The logical suspects piped up, and according to the Times’
“Letters” section, the piece “caused a mini-boom of angry
readers to suggest that he [me] re-check his [my] numbers–and their
implications for future generations.”
I have. Let’s talk about numbers
first. The data I use are correct and come directly from World Population
Prospects: 1996 Revision, published by the United Nations. My thesis comes
from those data: Never before have birth rates and fertility rates fallen so
far, so fast, so low, for so long all around the world. There is every reason
to believe that these downward trends are still in motion, notwithstanding the
Chicken Little rhetoric still coming from population and environmental
activists.
Let’s look at aspects of the global Total
Fertility Rate, which, roughly speaking, represents the average number of
children born per woman, per lifetime. A rate of 2.1 children per woman, the
“replacement rate,” is needed to keep a modern population stable over
time. Why? Parents, of which each child has two, eventually die. If they are
not “replaced” by two children, population ultimately declines.
In
the More Developed Regions (where we live, and including Europe and Japan)
the TFR has fallen from 2.8 children per woman in the 1950-55 time frame
to 1.6 today. Red flag! Alarm bells! That 1.6 is almost 25 percent below
the replacement rate.
In
the Less Developed Countries, those allegedly teeming, swarming places
where the putative population bomb is allegedly ticking, the fertility
rate was six children per woman as recently as 1965-70. That was truly
explosive. But now it’s three, and falling more quickly than anything
previously seen in demographic history.
Italy,
a Catholic country, has a fertility rate of 1.2 children per woman, the
lowest rate in the world–and the lowest rate in the history of the world
(absent famines, plagues, wars, or economic catastrophes). The Japanese
rate has plunged to 1.4 children per woman, which, if maintained, would
cut the Japanese population in half by the middle of the next century. In
Russia, it’s also 1.4. The all-Europe rate is 1.5 children per woman.
American
rates are much higher than Europe’s but have nonetheless been below replacement for 25 straight years. There was an up-tick in the late 1980s,
but rates have fallen for five of the last six years, and the National
Center for Health Statistics reports lower rates for the early part of
1997. (Ken, we can consider the matter of immigration later in this
thread.)
In
Muslim Tunisia over the last three decades the rate has fallen from 7.2 to
2.9. Rates are higher than that, but way down, in Egypt, Iran, and Syria.
The rate in India is lower than the American rate in the 1950s. The rate
in Bangladesh has fallen from 6.2 to 3.4– in just 10 years! Mexico has
moved 80 percent of the way to replacement level. Fertility rates in many
(not all) sub-Saharan African nations have dropped solidly, including Kenya’s–a country once regarded as a demographic horror show. For decades
the sub-Saharan Africa rates seemed stuck at a stratospheric 6.5. But
since the early 1980s, rates have come down, to 5.8–obviously still very
high, but about a fifth of the way toward replacement-level fertility.
This sounds
strange to the modern ear. We have gone through a half-century of the greatest
population growth in history, and such growth has not yet ended. We’re due for
at least an additional 2 billion people by 2050, even in the United Nations’
Low Variant projection. That’s a lot. But then global population will likely
start shrinking. Repeat: shrinking. What’s happening is that two powerful
trends–the population explosion and the baby bust–are now at war. They can
coexist (because of “demographic momentum”), but only for a while.
Mounting evidence makes it clear which trend will prevail: the baby bust. (Recently, for the first time, the United Nations convened a working group of
demographers to give guidance regarding how deeply to cut their Middle Variant
projections in 1998.)
We can talk about a variety of plausible
scenarios and their implications. I think the new data make it likely
that total future global population will fall far short of current MV estimates
and quite possibly make a happy mockery of some gloom-and-doom prophecies,
notably on the global-warming front. I think the effects of this demographic
sea change may make it economically difficult for elderly pensioners; harm some
businesses (try building new houses in a depopulating country); possibly change
the geopolitical balance of influence away from America and the West; and make
for a lonelier human species with missing children, missing grandchildren,
children missed, and grandchildren missed. On the other hand, of course, global
population growth must end sooner or later.
Stipulated: Talk about implications is
conjectural. What is not conjecture is that we are entering a new demographic
era, and that the change will affect most every aspect of our lives. We ought
to pay close attention to what’s going on. We ought to think about what, if anything, we should do about what’s going on. Simply repeating the old,
alarmist, explosionist bromides is both wrong-headed and harmful.
Look forward to our chat.
Best,
Ben
1) Dear Ben, Posted:
Friday, January 9, 1998, at 12:30 AM PT
Good news is not newsworthy, so
journalists, politicians, and populists need to put a negative spin on events.
It is very likely that the population explosion is not going to be quite as
explosive as was expected a few years back. That’s the good news. However, it
was a big bang and isn’t over yet. Let’s look at some absolute numbers, rather
than rates.
World population today is 5.9 billion,
up from 1.6 billion at the beginning of the century and 2.5 billion in 1950. By
the year 2050, the U.N. Medium Variant projects a population of 9.4 billion.
Thus the next 50 years are likely to see an increase of world population
greater than one-half its current population and greater than the increase
since 1950.
In the last five years of the present
millennium, births outnumber deaths by about 81 million per year (133 million
births, 52 million deaths). World population grows by this 81 million per year,
a net gain equal to one-third of the total population of the United States every year. By the year 2050, even under the new, lower U.N. projections,
births will still outnumber deaths by 44 million a year (131 million births, 87
million deaths).
Now let’s talk about rates, and
particularly current low rates in the established market economies. First, the
Total Fertility Rate is a fertility measure, not a replacement measure. It has
no mortality component. In a very low mortality setting such as the United
States, a TFR of 2.1 children per woman (or, more accurately, about 2.08) is
needed for replacement, to allow for a slight mortality loss prior to
childbearing and to allow for the higher proportion of male to female births.
However, in a high mortality setting, much higher TFRs are needed for
replacement. Roughly speaking, if the risk of dying by age 30 is 50 percent,
the “replacement” TFR is over 4. This is important when comparing
fertility today with fertility in, say, 1950, when mortality was much higher:
The world TFR has declined by about 47 percent, while the Net Reproduction
Rate, which is the key indicator from a population-growth perspective, has
declined by less than 30 percent.
In your article in the New York Times
Magazine, you compare the most recent U.N. projections with earlier ones and
conclude that “demographers were caught with their projections up,”
and that “650 million people were ‘missing’.” Amartya Sen has
effectively used the word “missing” to highlight excess female
mortality in certain regions of the world: The women were born, but died
prematurely. To describe those never born as missing seems incorrect; we should
call them “delayed.”
As demographers, we should admit that
our projections are always wrong: sometimes up, sometimes down. We tend to
assume that changes in trends are short-term aberrations that will quickly
reverse. Both the baby boom and the baby bust were unforeseen. In 1950, making
projections to 1960, the U.S. Census Bureau assumed that TFR would fall by 25 percent by 1959-60; in fact, it rose by nearly 20 percent. In 1958, making
projections to 1975, the bureau made some fertility assumptions: that TFR would
rise by 10 percent, stay constant, fall by 14 percent by 1967, and then stay
constant; or fall by 28 percent by 1967, and then stay constant. In fact, it
fell by over 50 percent. We do not know what makes fertility go up or down, so
we can’t forecast it at all accurately even for 10 years, let alone 50.
One thing we do know about fertility is
that period rates–rates for particular calendar years–tend to exaggerate
trends. At the peak of the baby boom, in 1958, TFR reached 3.7; no cohort of
women (women born in a particular time period) averaged more than 3.1 children
at the end of their reproductive lives. At the trough of the baby bust, in
1976, TFR reached 1.74; no cohort of women has averaged less than 1.97 children
at the end of their reproductive lives. Timing of childbearing effects are superimposed
on underlying trends to exaggerate the rapidity of change. Current very low
fertility in Italy probably reflects both an underlying trend and strong period
effects.
I expect the current very low fertility
levels in Europe and Japan to move higher over the next 10 years. However, even
if they don’t, the consequences are not as dramatic as you suggest. Take the
example of Japan. You state that if the current Japanese TFR of 1.4 is maintained, the Japanese population will be halved by the middle of the next
century. The U.N. Low Variant projection for Japan uses a constant TFR of 1.43
to 2050, and the population declines from 125 million in 1995 to 96 million in
2050. Not quite halved by my arithmetic.
What are the social and economic
consequences? You talk of “missing children, and missing
grandchildren” and a lonelier human species. If couples are having as many children as they want (the objective of family-planning programs), it is hard
to see that they have missing children. Grandparents have less control (though
are not without influence), but even here perspective matters: fewer
grandchildren per grandparent means a greater share of a grandparent per
grandchild. Personally, I don’t think I would find a globe with 9.6 billion
people on it very lonely: even with 5.9 billion, it has more traffic jams than
I care for. The economy will see winners and losers, as with all change.
Housing prices are unlikely to escalate, and diaper manufacturers face a
dampened market. On the other hand, retirement communities and manufacturers of
prosthetic devices are likely to do well.
And then there is the migration issue.
Any “problem” raised by below-replacement fertility in market
economies is a distributional problem: too many graybeards. Worldwide, births
still outnumber deaths by a substantial margin. Any shortage of labor that may
arise (and it certainly hasn’t arisen yet in Europe, with unemployment rates in
excess of 10 percent) can be met through immigration. The United States,
whether by luck or by judgment, has followed such a policy for decades and is
now probably reaping the benefits of it.
Bottom line: The population explosion is
still with us. Population issues in the market economies are different from
those in Africa. Policy responses should be different too.
I’m enjoying our chat already! I don’t
get many opportunities to speculate on a grand scale!
Best wishes, Ken
