Answer question 3-1,3-2, 4-1 and 4-2. Please label each response with the question. Ie. you would type “3-1: follow with answer”. Reference page and title page is not needed.
3-1: As you will remember from MCDP-4, logistics exist to support maneuver, and logistic plans strive to meet three primary characteristics: “integration with operation plans, flexibility, and simplicity.” How do the logistics planning concepts from the reading support our maneuver warfare philosophy? How do the logistic planning outputs (estimates, Physical Network Analyses, distribution network models, etc.) contribute to the planning concepts and achieve the three primary characteristics?
3-2: All logistics systems have two fundamental elements: a distribution system and a command and control (C2) system that links the distribution system to planning and execution of operations. In a distributed maritime operating environment, how does a more dispersed distribution network and C2 system affect planning for resources (apportioning and allocating resources, establishing distribution priorities, and anticipating demands)? What logistics considerations might you employ as a planner to overcome these challenges? In answering, use the principles of logistic support to justify your response.
4-1: Consider the arrival and assembly area (AAA) for an MPF MEB operation. What general conditions must be met from an enemy, friendly, and environmental perspective for the MPF offload to be successful? In answering, seek to include references to multiple domains (e.g., air, sea, land, space, cyberspace, and the electromagnetic spectrum).
4-2: In his 38th Commandant’s Planning Guidance, General David Berger calls for the review and modification of the MPF concept. In that regard, consider this short reflection: In 1990, the Marine Corps conducted an MPF offload at a coastal port in Saudi Arabia in support of Operation DESERT SHIELD. Saddam Hussein watched it happen and then was soundly defeated in the subsequent campaign in Kuwait. In 2003, the Marine Corps conducted an MPF offload in Kuwait in support of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. Saddam Hussein watched it happen, saw his military destroyed, was deposed from power and eventually executed by the government of Iraq. What are the lessons that our future adversaries can take from Saddam Hussein’s experience with MPF (and for that matter, a time-consuming US strategic build-up)? Extending the question, why is MPF in its current form not viable against a near-peer competitor such as Russia or China? How should it change consistent with the Commandant’s guidance?
